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The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) is the latest in a series of attempts to 
introduce performance budgeting at the federal level in the United States; attempts that largely failed 
due to administrative complexities, lack of investment in managerial, accounting, and information 
systems, and the absence of institutional incentives to promote gains in economic efficiency.  If the 
GPRA were to succeed in significantly altering the focus of federal budgeting from inputs to outputs 
and, more importantly, outcomes, it is likely to have a positive influence for years to come.  While 
we find the objective of GPRA laudable, we do not believe that the GPRA, in its current form, will 
succeed in transforming the focus of federal budgeting from annual line-item appropriations to multi-
year outputs and outcomes.  The GPRA fails to address the incentive structure of the current budget 
process; does not provide an independent mechanism by which performance plans and reports can be 
audited for accuracy; and does not provide a formal framework by which departments and Congress 
can contract on cost, output, and performance terms.   
 
JEL Classification Numbers: D73, G38 
 
Keywords:  Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, GPRA, Performance Budgeting 
                                                          
1 Authors= address:  Robert M. McNab (rmmcnab@nps.navy.mil) and Francois Melese (fmelese@nps.navy.mil): 
Defense Resources Management Institute and Naval Postgraduate School, 1522 Cunningham Road, Monterey, CA 
93943, USA. We are grateful to Diana Angelis, Jameson Boex, Jon Czernacki, Mark Murphy, Cary Simon and 
Michael Stroup for their comments and suggestions.  Any earlier version of this paper was presented at the RAND 




1.  Introduction 
 
The objective of this paper is to review the apparent resurrection of performance budgeting in 
the United States and to evaluate the prospects of success for the Government Performance and 
Results Act of 1993 (GPRA).2  Preceded by the Financial Management Initiative (Great Britian, 
1982), Programme Management and Budgeting (Australia, 1983), Public Finance Act (New Zealand, 
1989) and the Chief Financial Officers Act (United States, 1990), the GPRA is the latest in a series 
of international budget reforms with the objective of shifting the focus of policymakers and budget 
practitioners from expending resources to providing outputs and services to customers (Mascarenhas, 
1996).3  Each of these initiatives shares the common goals of improving decision-making processes 
between the various branches of government, restructuring management processes to enhance 
administrative and economic efficiency, and increasing accountability to taxpayers.  Curiously, even 
though its potential impact on the federal budgeting process is significant, the GPRA has received 
scant attention in the economics literature.4 
We believe that our review and assessment of the GPRA is timely and pertinent given that 
the federal government is only now entering the second year of full GPRA implementation.  If the 
GPRA significantly alters the focus of federal budgeting from annual line-item appropriations and 
obligations to near and long-term operational and strategic objectives, it is likely to have a positive 
                                                          
2  See Public Law 103-62 approved on August 3, 1993 for the full text of the Government Performance and Results 
Act. 
3  In this paper we use the terms Aperformance based budgeting@ and Aperformance budgeting@ interchangeably.  We 
define performance budgeting in the widest context as any initiative or reform that attempts to quantify public sector 
outputs or outcomes and to explicitly incorporate the outputs and outcomes in the budgeting process.   
4  Jones and McCaffery (1992, 1993, 1997) and Meyers (1999) are among those who have examined the structure of 
the GPRA.  See Jordan and Hackbart (1999) and Willoughby and Melkers (1998, 2000) for reviews of performance 




influence on federal budgeting for years to come.  On the other hand, if the GPRA creates incentives 
for federal agencies to understate their capabilities or overstate their resource requirements, then it is 
likely the GPRA will become another in the long list of discontinued federal budgeting reforms.  We 
believe that three key challenges must be surmounted for the GPRA to be considered a success.  
First, the GPRA must create an institutional framework conducive to forming consensus on a unique 
set of objectives among the various stakeholders.  Second, the GPRA must achieve its ultimate stated 
objective of linking resources to results - or to relate data on program performance to appropriation 
account structures - for the conjectured efficiency gains to be realized.  Finally, the GPRA must 
overcome a traditional system of budgeting that, while often criticized and the focus of almost 
continuous reform efforts, has survived to this day (Wildavsky, 1992).  
In this paper we review the GPRA and whether it can be successful given its current structure 
and the experience of other budgeting reforms in the United States and elsewhere in the world.  In 
Section 2, we review the differences between control and performance budgets, noting how 
performance budgeting reforms are designed to address the incentive structure of control budgets.  In 
Section 3, we briefly examine the four significant federal performance oriented budgeting initiatives 
since World War II and discuss what lessons have been learned from these and more recent 
international performance oriented budget reforms.  We briefly review the GPRA in Section 4 and 
follow with a discussion of incentives and the budget process in Section 5.  In Section 6, we discuss 
the problem of achieving consensus among the many stakeholders and the development of 





2. Are there significant differences between control and performance budgets? 
Typically, public budgets serve three different functions: a planning function, a management 
function, and a control function (Shick, 1966).5  These functions roughly correspond to the four 
stages of the budget cycle: executive preparation and legislative review (planning), execution 
(management), and audit (control).6  While traditional, control focused budgets are oriented toward 
the allocation of resources among different expenditure categories, performance budgets instead 
focus on the outcomes generated by the final production of public goods and services.  Performance 
budgets generally emphasize two key elements: a) outputs and the inputs required by government 
agencies to produce the outputs in question; and b) outcomes which are implicitly assumed to 
represent consumer preferences for public goods and services.  If, as currently envisioned in the 
GPRA, budget requests are to be ultimately tied to outcomes, then the role of federal budgeting and 
accounting systems will need to shift from principally a control function to more of a planning and 
management function.7 
The planning function of public budgeting typically emphasizes the allocation of resources 
among competing public programs and roughly coincides with the concept of allocative efficiency. 
Traditionally, due the political nature of the planning function, it has resided at the highest levels of 
government.  While the planning function of public budgeting focuses on the inter-program 
allocation of public resources, the management function instead focuses on the intra-program 
                                                          
5  Wildavsky (1974) noted that public budgets can be thought of as a series of objectives with price tags attached to 
each objective. 
6  See McCaffery (1999) for a discussion of the four stages of the federal budget process. 
7  Eventually, the annual performance plan of each agency is to be integrated with the agency=s budget request so as 




allocation of resources.  The management function may influence allocative efficiency through the 
reallocation of intra-program resources and technical efficiency through improved management and 
production techniques.  Finally, the control function of public budgeting focuses on the legal, 
administrative, and other restrictions on the expenditure of public resources and is often thought of 
as the mechanism by which government is accountable to the taxpayer. 
Control budget systems are principally designed to allocate and track expenditures on inputs 
to ensure fiscal accountability and to minimize the misappropriation of public resources.8  Control 
systems typically rely on statutory requirements, administrative procedures, and institutional 
structures to minimize diversion or misuse of public funds.  Departments may argue for greater 
flexibility and less oversight in the use of public resources in order to respond to what they view as 
the evolving preferences and needs of their customers.  Congress, on the other hand, may feel the 
need to exercise the power of the purse and increase its restrictions on the use of appropriations and 
oversight of departmental operations to ensure the appropriate use of public resources and 
accountability to taxpayers (Pitsvada, 1983, 1998).   
Ironically, while a control budget’s primary function is to insure accountability to taxpayers, 
this function may be subverted by the focus on expending current resources and maintaining the 
current level of appropriations.  The incentive structure of a control system is negative in orientation, 
that is, non-use or misuse of public resources results in the imposition of institutional (lowered 
appropriations in succeeding fiscal years) and personal penalties (demotion, reassignment, or, in the 
worst cases, incarceration).   While the inputs in a control system are readily quantifiable and thus 
can be managed with standard accounting and management techniques, the transaction costs of 
                                                          




administering a control system may increase over time due to the proliferation of administrative, 
statutory, and institutional requirements.  Moreover, there is no guarantee that control budgeting and 
accounting systems encourage cost-minimizing behavior.  
An example of the perverse incentives created by control budgeting is the “use it or lose it” 
phenomenon (Niskanen, 1971, 1972, 1975, 1994).  Congress typically appropriates monies to 
agencies on an annual basis to fund operations throughout the fiscal year and may be hesitant to 
provide supplemental appropriations except in cases of significant national interest (natural disasters, 
acts of war, or other emergencies).  Congress also places restrictions on the reprogramming of 
appropriations (inputs) between line items.9  Moreover, funds not spent or obligated by the end of the 
fiscal year typically cannot be transferred to the next fiscal year, that is, either the funds are expended 
or they are lost.  Public sector managers rationally respond to these incentives by ensuring their 
appropriations are exhausted by the end of the current fiscal year and by engaging in defense actions 
to preserve their current budgetary allocation.  Cost savings are not a product of the incentive 
structure and are often viewed as a threat to the prospects of maintaining or increasing the 
organization’s appropriations in the future. 
The incentive structure of the control budget is such that public managers are penalized for 
identifying and implementing cost saving techniques.  Departments that expend their appropriated 
resources in the current fiscal year may be rewarded with an equal or greater appropriation in the 
following fiscal year.  On the other hand, departments that realize cost savings through process 
                                                          
9  Reprogramming is the transfer of funds within an appropriation to purposes other than those intended at the time 
the appropriation was requested and approved by Congress.  In some instances, agencies are allowed to reprogram 
resources from one program activity to another as long as the amount of resources does not exceed the threshold 




improvements or managerial reforms may have their budgets reduced in the following fiscal year and 
the resources transferred to organizations that met or exceeded their funding levels.  Departments 
with shrinking client bases (agriculture and veterans administration, for example) may respond by 
expanding their portfolios to retain or increase current levels of funding, leading to complex 
institutional structures where several agencies offer rival public services.  In effect, the institutional 
structure of control budgeting appears to reward agencies that are over budget while penalizing 
departments for implementing reforms that improve technical efficiency.  Addressing this moral 
hazard is one of the primary arguments for the implementation of a performance based budgeting 
system (Melese, 1997). 
Performance based budgeting initiatives attempt to address what is perceived as the flawed 
incentive structure of control or input oriented budgeting systems by shifting the focus from resource 
allocation to outcome (or output) generation.10  By shifting emphasis from inputs to outcomes, the 
planning and management functions of the budget are supposed to gain importance relative to the 
control function in a performance budget.  However, the case for performance budgeting rests on 
three implicit assumptions: (a) goal congruence -- that departments can develop relevant and useful 
strategic plans; (b) measurement -- that goals can be quantified so that success in achieving the 
goals or outcomes can be checked in performance reports; and (c) incentives -- that control 
budgeting systems can be redesigned to tie budgets to outcomes and sufficient motivation exists for 
organizations to effectively allocate resources and administer programs. In linking resources to 
                                                          
10 Activity Based Costing (ABC) may be thought of as an effort to address this problem. Under ABC, input or 
control budget data (costs) associated with specific activities are aggregated to serve a management function. Ideally, 
this effort will offer public managers the opportunity to identify the true costs of providing specific outputs.  See 




results, the last step of performance budgeting attempts to refocus attention from the control to the 
management and planning functions.  
 
3.   What lessons can be drawn from the performance budgeting experience in the United 
States and other countries? 
 
As the one of the last major government-wide budgeting reforms of the 20th century, we 
believe that it is useful to adopt two different perspectives while discussing the Government 
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). Viewed historically, the GPRA is the latest iteration 
in a series of government-wide performance budgeting initiatives. Viewed contemporaneously, 
GPRA is the leading initiative among a host of current federal management and financial reforms. In 
this section, we first review the most significant performance budgeting initiatives in the United 
States since World War II.  We then examine some of the more recent international budgeting 
reforms and conclude with the lessons these initiatives hold for the United States.  
 
3.1 Why have the previous attempts at performance budgeting failed in the United States?  
While the GPRA is perhaps the most significant federal budgeting initiative in the past ten 
years, it is by no means the only attempt by the federal government to explicitly incorporate 
outcomes into the budgeting process.  Four major federal government-wide performance budgeting 
initiatives have been attempted since World War II.  These include: 1) the Budget and Accounting 
Procedures Act; 2) the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System; 3) Management by Objectives; 




as we discuss below, the difficulty in transforming the focus of the federal budgeting process from 
inputs to outcomes. 
BAPA (Budget and Accounting Procedures Act):  In 1949, the Hoover Commission presented 
the framework for the first federal performance budget with the explicit objective of shifting the 
federal government’s budgeting focus from allocating resources to managing outcomes.  Congress 
adopted the framework purposed by the Hoover Commission in 1950 with the Budget and 
Accounting Procedures Act.11  The BAPA required that the President’s budget submittal to Congress 
be expressed not only in terms of line items of expenditure (inputs) but also in terms of functions and 
activities (intermediate outputs).  While the intent of BAPA was to shift the focus of federal budgets 
from inputs to outputs, the impact of BAPA appears to have been limited to two innovations.  First, 
data closely akin to average variable cost data was now included in the budget submittal to illustrate 
the incremental cost (savings) of increasing (or decreasing) certain programs.  Second, the 
presentation of the budget submittal was revised to include “obligations by activities” which 
described the major programs, projects, and activities associated with budget requests.    
PPBS (Planning Programming and Budgeting System):  Mandated by President Johnson in 
1965, the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System attempted to introduce an explicit decision-
making framework to the executive branch’s budget formulation process. The PPBS approach 
consisted of three distinct phases: Planning -- the definition and examination of alternative goals and 
objectives; Programming  -- the definition and analysis of alternative actions to achieve those goals 
together with their resource implications; and, Budgeting  -- the formulation, justification to the 
Congress, execution and control of the budget.  While the planning and budgeting phases of the 
                                                          




PPBS system did not significantly differ from the existing federal budgeting process, the 
programming phase attempted, for the first time, to create an explicit, institutional linkage between 
the planning and budgeting components of the budget process.  By attempting to introduce 
constrained optimization techniques into the federal budgeting process, the PPBS was seen as a 
means of encouraging an analytical, intertemporal approach to decision-making that emphasized the 
systematic evaluation of alternatives through the use of cost-benefit and systems analysis.  Instead of 
the annual focus of previous budgeting systems, the PPBS encouraged multi-year discounting, 
intertemporal tradeoffs among competing programs, and provided incentives for the complete 
accounting of all relevant costs, to include the positive and negative externalities associated with 
budgetary decisions.  The PPBS introduced one other significant innovation by attempting to 
explicitly link program elements (measurable inputs) and program categories (intermediate outputs 
and activities) to multi-year objectives.12 
While the PPBS introduced systems analysis and multi-year discounting into the federal 
budgeting process, the system failed to provide the proper incentives to emphasize the output side of 
the budget.  Part of the failure of the PPBS can also be attributed to the lack of preparation of 
executive departments and Congress for its implementation (Premchand, 1983).  The annual budget 
cycle also placed significant time pressure on the programming phase of the PPBS and the 
administrative and reporting requirements of the PPBS increased significantly over time.  Today, 
what remains of the PPBS can be found in the budget formulation process of the United States 
Department of Defense (DoD) where PPBS is still used to develop the DoD budget that is included 
in the President’s annual budget submittal to Congress.    
                                                          




MBO (Management by Objectives): Following the government-wide discontinuation of 
PPBS, the Nixon Administration launched Management by Objectives in 1973 in another attempt to 
explicitly link agencies’ objectives to their budget requests.13  MBO sought to create an institutional 
environment within which agency managers would be evaluated against negotiated outputs and 
outcomes.  While performance was typically defined as intermediate processes and outputs, some 
efforts were made to link outcomes to budget requests.  The MBO system consisted of three phases: 
objective setting - negotiating outputs or outcomes to be achieved; implementation - executing the 
budget to achieve the desired objectives; and evaluation - the use of qualitative and quantitative 
tools to evaluate results and the use of resources.  While the focus of the PPBS was on financial 
inputs and economic costs, MBO instead focused on the management process and was an attempt to 
improve managerial efficiency.  As with BAPA and PPBS, MBO was discontinued when its initiator, 
President Nixon, left office.  Among the list of failures associated with MBO were data problems in 
that MBO was apparently too far removed from the agencies to effectively negotiate and evaluate 
performance (Tossi, Rozzo, and Carroll, 1970; Tossi and Carroll, 1971).  
ZBB (Zero-Base Budgeting):  Introduced in 1977 by President Carter, the Zero-Base 
Budgeting system attempted to create an institutional environment in which agencies were required 
to set priorities based on program results that could be achieved at different spending levels.14  As 
with PPBS, the ZBB approach was a move away from the incremental budgeting approach of 
traditional budgeting (Meyers, 1999).  The goal of the ZBB was to more clearly identify programs 
                                                          
13  See Tosi, Rizzo, and Carroll (1970), Tosi and Carroll (1971), Morrisey (1976), and Odiorne (1979) for 
discussions of Management by Objectives budgeting techniques. 




through an array of decision packages at three different resource levels.  By examining programs at 
three different resource levels, the ZBB sought to develop a clear and precise link between budgetary 
resources and program results (Lewis, 1952).  In developing budget proposals, alternatives were 
ranked against each other without reference to historical expenditures and with a focus on total rather 
than marginal expenditures.  While the concept of the ZBB was intuitively appealing, the ZBB 
system was unable to overcome the preoccupation of government agencies with current operations 
(Shick, 1978).  The ZBB was discontinued early in the Reagan Administration. 
Why did these reforms fail?  Although the consensus in the literature appears to be that the 
previous attempts at performance-oriented budget process reform largely failed to meet their stated 
objectives, we believe that these efforts laid the foundation for the current performance-oriented 
effort currently underway in the United States.  Several lessons can be drawn from the efforts.  First, 
the effort to implement performance budgeting requires a significant investment in accounting and 
information systems and human capital.  If, as in the United States, systems have been developed to 
allocate and track the expenditure of fiscal resources, and not the influence of these expenditures on 
outputs and outcomes, then these systems will require modification to link inputs (appropriations and 
obligations) to outcomes and outcomes (acres of forest managed, number of clients served, reduction 
in specific types of pollution).  Second, while the impetus for budget process reform may be a “top-
down” initiative, the modified process must be sufficiently flexible to encompass the diverse inputs 
and outputs of the various federal departments and agencies.  These organizations should be granted 
sufficient autonomy in the budget process to develop their objectives and to allocate resources across 




stakeholders.  Third, the determination and evaluation of performance objectives requires input from 
the various stakeholders, to include the legislative branch and, where appropriate, the client base.  
PPBS and ZBB were impeded by the exclusion of the various stakeholders in the performance 
planning and measurement process.  When the budgets developed using these methodologies were 
presented to Congress, they were often misunderstood and viewed with suspicion as products of the 
executive branch that were developed without the appropriate level of Congressional input.  For 
budget reform to be successful, Congress should take an active role in the development of the reform 
process to ensure that its views and concerns are adequately addressed by the impending reforms. 
 
3.2 What can we learn from performance budgeting reforms in other countries? 
The United States is not the only developed country to introduce significant budget process 
reforms in the past decade.  Several other OECD countries, to include Austria, Australia, Germany, 
Great Britain, and New Zealand have undertaken reforms with the objective of moving the focus of 
the budget process from an annual, line-term perspective to a multi-year, performance based focus.  
Three general trends emerge from these efforts.15  First, many of these countries have introduced 
performance budgeting techniques in an attempt to quantify performance and to explicitly link 
resource allocation with performance.  Second, there has been a tendency to move away from 
centrally driven budgets to budgets that are created by line departments and ministries.  Third, each 
of these countries moved to highlight, and in some cases, explicitly incorporate, the multi-year 
budgetary implications of resource allocation decisions. 
                                                          
15  Premchand (1999) reviews budget techniques in the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom.  Boex, Martinez-Vazquez, and McNab (2000) examine multi-year budgeting techniques and their 




What lessons do these reforms hold for the United States?  First, performance oriented 
budget reform cannot be successful without reforms in other supporting budget processes.  
Examining the budget reforms in Australia, Great Britain, and New Zealand, we note that the reform 
process has been systemic rather than piecemeal.16  Performance objectives have been tied to multi-
year budget estimates that are consolidated in a centralized budget database.   The role of the central 
finance department or ministry has been transformed from one of generating estimates and resource 
allocations to one of providing budgetary guidance, consolidation, and evaluation of the estimates of 
the line departments and ministries.  The line departments and ministries, and not the central finance 
department, have assumed the responsibility of generating their budget estimates.  While variations 
exist among the Commonwealth countries, this approach to budgeting appears to be a marked 
departure from that currently practiced by the federal government in the United States. 
                                                          
16  See Premchand (1990, 1994, 1996) and Meyers (1999) for further information on performance budgeting and 
budgeting techniques in OECD and other countries. 
Second, as we noted in the preceding section, budget process reform requires a significant 
investment in accounting and information systems and personnel.  Financial investment must be 
accompanied by an empowerment of line departments and agencies through enhanced flexibility in 
personnel and other policies.  In Great Britain, for example, budget reform resulted in the creation of 
new task-oriented agencies.  The heads of these agencies, which were hired on a contractual basis, 
were given control over resources and were held accountable for results.  At the same time, heads of 
traditional agencies were gradually granted the authority to determine the pay scales for their 




management to oversight, audit, and, when necessary, intervention (Premchand, 1999).  In Australia, 
the on-going budget reform process has led the Australian Department of Finance and 
Administration to offer training programs for the support staff of Members of Parliament.  These 
programs were designed not only to address the need for training for budget analysts in the executive 
branch of government, but also the legislative branch of government. Supporting this effort was the 
implementation of the Parliamentary Services Suite, which replaced a number of aging information 
systems and incorporated financial management, entitlements processing, superannuation and human 
resource management systems (ADOFA, 2000).   
Lastly, devolving authority in the budget process appears to enhance accountability and the 
transparency of the budget process.  In Great Britain, line departments are responsible for 
determining program priorities subject to general guidance provided by the Treasury.  Unlike the 
United States, line departments now have the authority to reprogram funds within their departments 
to concentrate scarce resources on higher priority programs by reducing or eliminating lower priority 
programs.  In this context, departments are responsible for allocating scarce resources to produce the 
best possible outcomes, so an incentive exists for departments to allocate resources in response to 
citizen preferences and to conserve scarce resources to meet program priorities.  Departments that 
achieve cost savings can transfer a portion of the savings to the next fiscal year, a provision that 
appears to be directly aimed at defeating the “use it or lose it” behavior associated with control 
oriented budgets.  These, and other reforms, appear to address the incentive structure associated with 





4. The Government Performance and Results Act 
Signed by President Clinton in 1993, the Government Performance and Results Act is the 
latest in a long line of federal initiatives to mandate performance budgeting.  Although the GPRA 
can be viewed as the culmination of a series of government-wide performance budgeting initiatives, 
it is also the leading initiative among a host of contemporary federal management and financial 
reforms. Noteworthy among these complementary contemporary reforms are: the Chief Financial 
Officers (CFO) Act of 1990; the Government Management Reform and Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Acts (GMRA and FASA) of 1994; and the Information Technology Management 
Reform Act (ITMRA) of 1996.17  The GPRA’s ambitious agenda includes three primary objectives: 
improving congressional decision-making; promoting better internal management of government 
programs; and increasing accountability to taxpayers.  
In order to accomplish this ambitious agenda, the GPRA consists of a four-step plan. The first 
step is for departments to submit five-year strategic plans containing general goals and objectives for 
all major functions and operations. The second step is for departments to develop annual 
performance plans expressing these goals and objectives in measurable form or, alternatively, 
through the inclusion of descriptive statements of minimally acceptable and successful programs.  
The third step is for departments to deliver annual performance reports to the President and Congress 
that measure progress toward performance objectives stated in their performance plans.  The final 
step is to link budgets with performance. 
Beginning with the 1999 budget cycle, all federal agencies submitted five-year strategic plans 
                                                          
17  See GAO (1997a), Jones and McCaffery (1992, 1993, 1997) and Meyers (1999), among others, for an 




to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  In these five-year plans, the agencies attempted to 
identify their objectives, how performance would be measured, and how the agencies would achieve 
their objectives over the course of the five-year plan.  Concurrent with the submittal of the five-year 
plans, the agencies also submitted their annual performance plans to Congress.  Beginning with the 
year 2000 budget cycle, agencies delivered their first annual performance reports that documented 
how well they met the prior year’s performance plans.  Meanwhile, OMB has developed an overall 
federal government performance plan from individual agencies’ performance plans. These overall 
performance plans are to be routinely submitted to Congress along with the President’s budget. The 
ultimate objective is to increase transparency by tying annual performance plans to agency budget 
requests.  
As discussed in the previous section, past budget initiatives tended to impose unique 
structures upon agencies in an attempt to capture performance information that proved difficult and 
costly to transform into the traditional congressional budget presentation framework.  Drawing upon 
this experience, Congress sought with GPRA to reform the budget process and develop performance 
budgeting within the existing budgeting structure and cycle.  Departments are required under GPRA 
to develop performance metrics and evaluate their performance relative to those metrics using the 
basic structures which form the basis for the Congressional budget presentations: program activities. 
 Departments are also required to display expenditures required to achieve performance objectives 
and to crosswalk performance objectives and the specific budget accounts funding the objectives 
(OMB, 1998a, 1998b).  The hope is that the previous impediments to budget process reform can be 




will be subsumed by the existing structure, thwarting the objective of linking expenditures to 
outcomes.  
Unlike many of the previous performance oriented budget process reforms, GPRA has been 
implemented on an incremental basis.  We believe that this alone is a significant improvement over 
the previous performance budgeting oriented attempts at reform.  The pilot program produced 
valuable information on the obstacles to achieving the stated objectives of the GPRA.  An important 
stumbling block uncovered by the Government Accounting Office in the test phase of GPRA was the 
problem many agencies faced in bringing stakeholders together to achieve consensus on a unique set 
of agency goals (GAO, 1997a, 1997b).  Before developing performance metrics, agencies must first 
overcome the problem of goal congruence.  Only when the agency, stakeholders, and clients have 
achieved consensus on a set of objectives can the agency develop metrics to gauge its performance 
over time relative to these objectives. 
A significant risk arising from the concurrent implementation of these financial (CFO and 
GRMA) and managerial (FASA and ITMRA) reforms is the potential increase in administrative and 
transaction costs.  In evaluating the costs associated with these initiatives, it is prudent to examine 
the opportunity costs involved in complying with these initiatives.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
the current burden of satisfying legislative requirements already absorbs valuable resources that, with 
the proper incentives, might otherwise be invested in improving the quality or quantity of public 
goods and services.18  The environment in which GPRA is being implemented may also be an 
impediment to reform.  Over two-thirds of federal workers in financial management positions were 
                                                          
18  In 1999, for example, 24 agencies produced audited financial statements, of which 14 received clean opinions.  
However, this success was, in some cases, attributed to intensive staff efforts to gather and reconcile information 




aged 45 or older in 1999 and the overall workforce is characterized as having significant skill 
imbalances relative to work requirements. 19 
 
5. Incentives, Performance, and Budgets 
 While the federal budgeting environment has changed significantly from the time of the 
Hoover Commission, the tying of monetary inputs to performance outcomes has remained an elusive 
objective.  If the GPRA is to create an explicit linkage between budget appropriations (and 
obligations) and the outcomes generated by public expenditure, it must create an institutional 
environment that rewards efficiency, transparency, and the prompt, concise, and accurate reporting of 
costs, outputs, and outcomes.  If the GPRA fails to create such an environment, departments are 
likely to respond to the current incentive structure by “gaming” their performance reports to present 
their activities in terms designed to maximize their budgets. 
 The current challenge facing Congress and other interested parties is to create a system of 
incentives to solicit the timely and accurate submittal of cost, output, and outcome data which can 
then be used in the budget process.  Departments, on the other hand, may be focused on objectives 
other than cost minimization or output maximization.  They may instead have the objective of 
obtaining budgets that provide as much residual funding as possible in excess of the true cost of 
providing a given level of output.20  Providing Congress with accurate information on costs and 
                                                          
19  The average age of the Federal worker was 45.9 years in 1999 and the share of Federal workers eligible for 
retirement has doubled over the last decade (GAO, 2001). 
20  Migue and Belanger (1974) refer to an agency’s budget surplus as discretionary spending that may be used to 
purchase items not directly related to the production of an agency’s output (new furniture, travel to conferences, and 




outputs may pose a threat to this objective.  If the department provides an output for which it is the 
sole supplier, it is likely that only the department will know the true cost of the output in question.  
Congress, in this case, may be dependent on the department for the provision of cost data.  In an 
environment characterized by asymmetric information and monopolistic supply, the department may 
be able to secure a budget that is greater than that desired by Congress (Niskanen, 1971; Miller, 
1977; Moene, 1986; Mueller, 1989; Wintrobe, 1997; Claar, 1998). 21 
 The task of creating an environment in which resources can be linked to outcomes is 
daunting.  Congress, in effect, would need to contract with the various agencies and departments on 
cost and performance terms.  In many cases, Congress (the principal) could not contract with each 
department (the agent) on its true objective.  Congress could not, for example, enter into a contract 
with the Department of Defense for a non-quantifiable amount of an outcome called “national 
security.”  The principal, when the outcome is not quantifiable, would have to use output or 
quantifiable performance measures (number of active-duty soldiers, aircraft carriers, or aircraft-
readiness rates) as a means of telling the agent what must be done.  However, since performance 
measures may not always provide the agent accurate incentives, the agent may engage in activities 
that the principal, if they had the agent’s information, would consider suboptimal (Baker, 1992). 
 In order to solicit accurate information from departments in support of the performance-
budgeting process, Congress should consider altering the incentives that influence the behavior of 
departments in the budget cycle.  The incentives-contracts literature is replete with examples of 
                                                          
21  Niskanen (1971) and Miller (1977) impose an additional constraint where the department’s sponsor presents a 
take-it-or-leave-it budget proposal.  Mueller (1989) and Claar (1998) are among those that have relaxed this 
assumption.  Imposing an additional constraint on the type of the budget proposal does not, given the other 




agents modifying their behavior in response to new incentive schemes.22  As noted previously, the 
current budgeting system has created a perverse incentive that rewards agents (departments) for 
budget-maximizing behavior (through static or increased funding levels in the next fiscal year) and 
penalizes those agents who engage in cost-saving behaviors.  This type of behavior could be 
attenuated by allowing agents to keep a portion of non-expended resources for discretionary 
activities.  Of course, the principal (Congress) would also have to contract with the various agents on 
output and performance terms, else agents would then have the incentive to conserve resources by 
constricting or lowering the quality of output. 
 Contracting on cost and performance data would also require that Congress and the executive 
branch move away from the current, adversarial budget process.  Congress can, in the current system, 
contract with each department on the quantity of output and the price per unit of output.  In the 
presence of asymmetric information on costs, monopolistic supply, and the principal contracting on 
output and unit cost, however, the welfare-maximizing unit price will be above the agent’s true 
marginal cost per unit of output (Claar, 1998).  The contracting process would also have to consider 
uncertainty in the demand for and production of public goods.  The principal, in order to provide the 
agent with incentives to accurately report their cost information, may have to pay a subsidy to elicit 
accurate information.  It is likely, given the literature on incentives and public sector performance, 
that Congress would have to offer pricing terms in excess of the true marginal cost of each 
department to effectively solicit cost and performance information. 
Even if Congress were to offer pricing terms in excess of the true marginal cost, the 
                                                          
22  See Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) for an analysis of multitask principal agent incentives and contracts.  
Wintrobe (1997) reviews the literature on bargaining games between government agencies and their sponsors while 




development of performance metrics that identify the influence of public expenditures on outcomes 
would not necessarily guarantee the adoption of these metrics by department managers.  They may, 
in fact, use metrics (unit costs, caseloads, and other cost-output information) with which they are 
most comfortable.  They are likely to take action to improve their performance in terms of these 
familiar metrics, even if such actions may be to the determinant to those outcomes that are of interest 
to their stakeholders (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).  Excessive quantities of goods and services 
whose characteristics are quantifiable and easily monitored may be produced as agents exploit 
principals who lack the knowledge on the true demand for public goods and services and the costs of 
producing them.  These behaviors favor programs for which metrics are readily available over those 
whose outcomes are more difficult to quantify.    Moreover, in the presence of asymmetric 
information, departments may also have the incentive to produce highly differentiated goods and 
services with characteristics that do not lend themselves to being measured or monitored (Niskanen, 
1971).   
In attempts to address some of these problems, Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand 
now allow departments to retain a portion of unexpended resources that arise due to cost-savings or 
process improvements.  Metrics can be used to identify cost-savings improvements that hold the 
quantity (or quality) or output constant in the case where outcomes are not readily quantifiable.  
Where outcomes can be quantified, departments can be rewarded by Congress for the development 
and use of new metrics that improve Congressional and Administration budgeting processes. By 
rewarding behavior that results in cost-savings or process improvements, some of the perverse 
incentives generated by the current system can be addressed. 23   
                                                          




Does the GPRA create an environment conducive to departments accurately reporting cost 
and performance information to Congress?  In its current form, the GPRA merely requires agencies 
to report cost and performance information to Congress.  Congress does not appear to contract with 
agencies on cost and performance terms.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that agencies remained 
focused on obligations and not performance (Anthony, 2000).  It does not appear that Congress is 
auditing the performance plans and reports for accuracy and is relying on the agencies to accurately 
state their cost and performance information.  As we have noted above, the incentive exists for 
agents to maximize the budget surpluses by overstating the true marginal cost of providing public 
output.  Departments also appear to be gaming the system by submitting performance plans and 
reports that number in the hundreds, if not thousands, of pages. 24  As the amount of data submitted 
to Congress increases, we believe that the ability of Congress to effectively process this information, 
given limited resources and time, decreases.  If true, this would mean that the asymmetry of 
information is becoming more pronounced over time. 
We believe that the GPRA fails to address the existing incentives in the federal budgeting 
process. Without a modification of these incentives, the final step of linking performance to budget 
decisions is unlikely to occur.  While the GPRA has established a framework for reporting cost and 
performance information, it lacks the incentives by which Congress can elicit accurate cost and 
performance data from departments.  Until these incentives are addressed, we believe that the impact 
of GPRA will be limited. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
quality; b) awards to individuals do not reduce the effectiveness of team production; and c) rewards are allocated based 
on internal process (product) improvements - and not on the basis of external (or exogenous) events (Melese, 1997). 
24  See http://www.firstgov.gov for copies of the annual performance plans and reports.  The General Accounting 
Office examines the submitted plans and reports and copies of these examinations may be found on the GAO’s 





6. The Problem of Goal Congruence  
While private sector performance can typically be captured in a single measure such as 
economic profit or return to investment, quantifying the performance of public sector organizations 
is a more difficult task.  Public sector organizations differ from private organizations in two 
fundamental respects.  First, public sector organizations lack a residual claimant.  Second, public 
sector organizations often lack a set of defined and quantifiable objectives (Courty and Marschke, 
1997).  Unlike the private sector where performance is often measured in terms of profit or return to 
investment, public sector organizations may require a set of metrics against which performance may 
be measured (Smith, 1996).   Developing performance metrics for public sector organizations is a 
necessary step in the process of linking inputs to outcomes.  Developing metrics, however, is only 
part of the problem.  The interested parties must first agree on what is to be measured before metrics 
can be developed to measure performance.   
 Public sector organizations, unlike their counterparts in the private sector, may have to 
answer to numerous, and often adversarial, stakeholders.  Each of these stakeholders (principals) 
may have a different set of preferences on the objectives and activities of each organization in which 
it has an interest.  The existence of multiple, competing stakeholders creates obstacles to achieving 
goal congruence.  That is, with multiple principals, it is difficult to achieve agreement on an agent’s 
goals and objectives.  Without goal congruence, developing performance metrics that can be used to 
evaluate an agent’s performance is difficult (Greiner, 1996). 




of governance, multi-principal politics also comes at a cost in terms of economic efficiency.  In a 
system where multiple principals compete for the dominance of their set of preferences, resources are 
allocated to activities that may not be economically efficient.  Inefficiencies may arise if the 
objective of a controlling group of principals is to transfer public resources to its supporters.25  Rent-
seeking behavior by principals can also lead to negative-sum games (Niskanen, 1971, 1974; 
Dunleavy, 1991).  When one set of principals seeks rents from the public sector, this action can 
motivate other principals to take action to protect their current benefits.  The net outcome may be 
that more resources are used in defensive and unproductive activities (promoting or defending a 
specific program or activity) than the actual value of the program or activity in question.  Achieving 
goal congruence is this environment is a difficult task in that it requires an answer to whose 
preferences will be considered in the setting of objectives and the development of performance 
metrics. 
In order to measure performance, agents must first develop sets of metrics against which the 
outcomes generated by the agents will be judged.  By developing performance metrics, agents are 
implicitly ranking the preferences of one group of principals over another (Smith, 1996).  Which 
groups’ preferences prevail ultimately depends upon the relative political power of the competing 
principals.  If it is still possible to fix the structure of the political game, three potential solutions 
exist to the multi-principal, multi-dimensional bargaining game.  First, one may restrict the 
principals’ incentive schemes so that each principal is allowed to observe and reward only the 
dimensions of output that are of direct concern to the principal.  Second, it may be possible to group 
                                                          
25  See Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Mauro (1995, 1998), Tanzi (1998), and Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000), among 




principals whose interests are closely aligned.  This creates homogenous groupings where the 
principals can collude to produce the desired result.   Finally, more agents can be created by 
reassigning activities and programs from the current set of agents, thereby reducing the externalities 
among the principals affected by the agents’ actions (Dixit, 1997). 
Even if we were able to create homogenous groupings of principals or split departments into 
small bureaus with highly specialized programs and activities, goal congruence may still be difficult 
to achieve.  Achieving the economic efficiency improvements that are the motivation for 
performance budgeting will invariably require the reallocation of inputs and outcomes, which would 
favor the preferences of one or more principals over others.  Reaching consensus on what objectives 
should be modified and how progress should be measured is likely to occur in an environment 
characterized by the presence of concentrated costs and diffuse benefits (Stiglitz, 1998).  Although 
the majority or all the principals may initially support the proposed efficiency improvements, the 
emergence of concentrated costs, which are borne by a sub-set of principals, may lead to the 
emergence of an active opposition to the proposed improvements.  The supporters of the proposed 
improvements may suffer from free riding and thus may encounter difficulty in defending their 
preferences against the objections of those who must bear the costs of the proposed reform (Olson, 
1971). 
With these problems in mind, we argue that contemporaneous decisions on objectives and 
performance metrics will shape coalitions in the future. Consider that every four years 
administrations can come and go, and every two years control of the House and Senate can shift from 




abide by their goals and objectives, they can affect the transaction costs of reversing their initiatives. 
 If people are more sensitive to losses than to gains, then losers will invest more in blocking (or 
undermining) than winners do to achieve gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1991). Thus, it is conceivable 
that inefficiency could actually be built into a government program as part of a legislative 
compromise over the goals of the program.  
Arriving at a single set of objectives and metrics may ultimately result from compromise, 
conflict, and confusion among the competing principals.  Nonetheless, by attempting to define goals, 
and measuring and rewarding outcomes relative to those goals through the budgeting process, 
performance budgeting systems seek to discipline public-sector agencies much as markets discipline 
firms. This approach underlies the contemporary resurrection of federal performance budgeting.  
Unfortunately, these attempts often neglect the power of the profit motive, the influence of 
competition, and the incentives needed to link performance to the allocation of scarce resources. 
Does the GPRA enhance goal congruence?  As noted above, the development and submittal 
to Congress of performance plans requires a degree of congruence within each organization.  
Whether congruence has been achieved between the organizations and Congress is an open question. 
 The recent change in Administrations has led to a call by Congress for the editing and re-submittal 
of performance plans so they are consistent with the new Administration’s priorities (Budget and 
Program, 2001).  We believe that if congruence had been achieved that the rewriting of performance 
plans would have not been considered.  What appears to be lacking with the GPRA, as we have 
noted in previous sections, is a formal mechanism by which departments and Congress establish 





Summary and Conclusions 
As we have discussed in this paper, the GPRA is a laudable effort to transform the focus of 
the federal budgeting process from inputs and outputs to outcomes.  Moving away from the current 
focus on obligations will be a difficult task.  Investments in human capital and information systems 
will be necessary.  Procedures will need to be modified and institutions will have to reform.  For 
performance budgeting to succeed, all these steps must occur. 
We do not, however, believe that GPRA, in its current form, can succeed in transforming the 
federal budgeting process.  The GPRA lacks a mechanism by which the incentive structure of the 
current budget process can be modified to reward behavior that results in cost-savings and efficiency 
improvements.  Departments, who may be penalized for accurately reporting about performance, are 
responsible for reporting their cost, output, and outcome information to Congress.  Congress, and 
departments for that matter, may lack adequate resources to link inputs to outcomes or to audit 
performance reports.  All this leads to an environment where departments can report on those outputs 
and outcomes that are easily managed and ignore those outcomes that are hard to measure, let alone 
monitor. 
We have, throughout this paper, developed several suggestions that should be adopted for 
GPRA to at least have a chance of succeeding.  First, Congress must remove the use-it-or-lose-it 
incentive by allowing departments to transfer savings between fiscal years.  This will require, at a 
minimum, a more comprehensive multi-year budgeting approach than is currently present at the 




reports in a manner consistent with financial audits in the private sector.  We believe that Congress 
should consider having private sector agencies audit the plans and performance reports of federal 
agencies.  Third, Congress must allocate sufficient resources to build the foundation of performance 
budgeting by investment in accounting and information systems and adequate training of personnel.   
If these steps do not occur, the future of GPRA is not bright.  As time passes, departments 
will learn of the gaming activities of other departments and follow suit.  Congress, already deluged 
with performance plans and reports in the thousands of pages, will see the amount of data submitted 
grow significantly.  At the same time, the information contained in these reports will become less 
accurate as departments strive to hide their true demand and cost information.  In the end, GPRA, 
like its predecessors, is likely to be discontinued unless the problems we noted in this paper are 
addressed.  The stakeholders in the budget process should recognize that GPRA has provided lessons 
upon which the next steps to performance budgeting can occur. The question is whether the 
stakeholders can achieve the necessary consensus to implement the reforms necessary to address 
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